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AGILE SECURITY FOR INFORMATION WARFARE: A CALL
FOR RESEARCH
Baskerville, Richard, Georgia State University, 35 Broad Street NW, Atlanta, Georgia
30302, USA, baskerville@acm.org

Abstract
The context of information security is changing dramatically. Networking technologies have
driven the global expansion of electronic commerce. Electronic commerce is increasingly
engaging sophisticated advances like digital agents and web services. As a result of such
advances, the information systems architectures that must be secured are becoming dynamic:
shifting landscapes of changing vulnerabilities. At the same time, the threats in these landscapes
are also becoming more sophisticated and dynamic. Information warfare is raising the stakes in
information security by leveling intensive and highly novel threats against civilian systems.
Information security researchers need to develop organizational approaches and methodologies
that respond to this new context. The conflation of information warfare and short cycle
development theories promises new information security practices. These approaches and
methodologies would effectively lead to agile information security development. Agile
information security development anticipates threats and rapidly deploys necessary safeguards in
the context of shifting systems landscapes amid pervasive systems threats.
Keywords: Information systems security, information warfare, security analysis and design,
agile methods, short cycle development, Internet speed.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the growing gap between the changing landscape of
information systems and the management of information security. This gap promises to bring a
continuing flood of system vulnerabilities, unless research and practice leads to new approaches
for the rapid and continuous development of security safeguards. As an analytical argument,
rather than empirical research, this paper contributes an important and overlooked research
agenda for information systems scholars in the coming decade.
The thread of this analysis and argument can be summarized as follows:
• The argument is premised on the emergent nature of globally competitive organizations.
• The context of information security is changing dramatically. Two particular arenas are
notable:
o First, Networking technologies have driven the global expansion of electronic commerce.
Electronic commerce is increasingly engaging sophisticated advances like digital agents
and web services. As a result of such advances, the information systems architectures that
must be secured are becoming dynamic: shifting landscapes of changing vulnerabilities.
o Second, the threats in these landscapes are also becoming more sophisticated and dynamic.
Information warfare is raising the stakes in information security by leveling intensive and
highly novel threats against civilian systems.
• Information security researchers need to develop organizational approaches and
methodologies that respond to this new context.
o The conflation of information warfare and short cycle development theories promises new
information security practices.
o These approaches and methodologies may effectively lead to agile information security
development and emergent security organizations.
• Such forms of information security development would anticipate threats and rapidly deploy
necessary safeguards in the context of shifting systems landscapes amid pervasive systems
threats.
• Important and timely research questions are shaped by these arguments, and provide a
research agenda that holds promise for greatly improving information systems security and
thereby enabling widespread new applications of information and communications
technologies.
This analysis and argument is developed in the following 4 sections. Section two analyses the
two important ways in which the context of Information security has become a more dynamic
setting, leading to emergent vulnerabilities and threats. Section three describes the need for
different forms of security organizations in order to respond to this new context. Section four
concludes with examples of research questions that must be addressed for Information security to
respond to these needs.
A key premise of this argument is the emergent nature of organizations and their information
systems (Bergquist, 1993). Emergent organizational forms endure continual change, a state in
which these organizations are constantly seeking stability, while never achieving it. The
emergence is more complex than simple environmental adaptiveness, but rather involves
organizational forms that interact with their context, continually remaking themselves in selfreferential ways (Varela, 1984).
Emergent organizations correspond well with dynamic
environments, such as highly competitive markets, by maintaining continual agility. As a
consequence, emergent organizations are necessarily unstable and, importantly from a security
perspective, are often unresponsive to centralized or hierarchical control. Of course, to a degree,
all viable organizations must be somewhat emergent. However, highly competitive and global

marketplaces have driven the need for increasing the tempo of organizational emergence in many
government and corporate organizations, while information and communications technologies
have simultaneously enabled large, complex, and global organizations to engage a faster pace of
emergence (Truex & Baskerville, 1998).
This organizational emergence has led to more emergent forms of information systems
development (ISD): Forms that respond to unpredictable organizational needs with activities that
are also unique and unpredictable (Truex, Baskerville, & Travis, 2000). Such forms of ISD
deliver information systems (IS) that emerge in concert with, and thereby in support of,
organizational emergence. Emergent ISD forms develop systems not as a series of defined
projects each having a clear beginning and end, but rather as continuous redevelopment of the
entire organizational portfolio of systems. These forms manage and orchestrate systems
development without a predefined sequence, control, rationality, or claims to universality. Often
associated with agile methodologies, such development has been compared to “growing”
information systems (a gardening metaphor) as an alternative to “building” systems (an
engineering metaphor) (Truex, Baskerville, & Klein, 1999).
Agile methodologies (Cockburn, 2001), are known by various terms such as short-cycle-time
development (Baskerville & Pries-Heje, 2004), and internet speed software (Baskerville, Levine,
Pries-Heje, Ramesh, & Slaughter, 2003).
Such methods involve high-speed software
development for intensely competitive markets, military applications, or in response to fast
moving technology. These methods offer an alternative that supplements slower, traditional
software methods where organizational settings permit tradeoffs between speed and quality,
scalability or maintainability. Over this premise on faster, concerted emergence of organizations
and their information systems, a security gap can easily open as shifting vulnerabilities and
threats gradually escape stabilized security safeguards.

2

CHANGING INFORMATION SECURITY CONTEXT

The context of information security is changing dramatically as organizations emerge at higher
tempos. Vulnerabilities and threats also emerge as the organizations and their information
systems are remade.
2.1

Technologically-driven Vulnerabilities

Rapid advances in networking technologies, together with the widespread access to networks,
have driven forward fast-paced global expansion of electronic commerce. Organizations
worldwide are participating as stakeholders in this networked commerce. This enormous
participation enables rapid development and deployment of exciting new technologies as
organizations seek to gain competitive advantages over their counterparts.
Recent examples of these sophisticated advances include digital agents and web services
(Walczak, 2002). Digital agents operate with a certain degree of intelligence and autonomy to
perform services across computing applications, platforms and networks. Web services enable
computing software to be delivered as a service to be performed rather than an appliance to be
sold, the software equivalent to selling the eggs rather than the chicken.
Digital agents and web services pose extremely dynamic security vulnerabilities (van der Merwe
& von Solms, 1998). In both situations, organizations have to be able to place strong degrees of
trust in software operating outside of their complete sphere of control. Where these agents and
web services are actually or potentially under the control of other organizations (e.g., trading
partners or government agencies), an organization’s Information security vulnerability landscape
could rapidly change beyond its control. For example, digital agents might be made to perform

malicious acts, such as destroying data or crashing systems (Abouzakhar & Manson, 2002). As
another example, web services could be corrupted in destructive ways, such as a credit card
verification service that verifies fraudulent credit cards.
Still, such networked technological advances promise to enable IS developers to more rapidly
construct and deploy new systems and new versions of systems. The resulting information
systems architectures become more dynamic. The architectures become more fluid as these
extend across networks and employ software components that have been developed, and are
being controlled, by other organizations. This shifting and increasingly dynamic architectural
landscape is also necessarily shifting and increasingly dynamic vulnerability landscape
(Badenhorst & Eloff, 1994).
2.2

Subjection Threats

It is not by chance that information and communication technologies are of growing political
interest. The increasing dependence on IS by so many important government, military, and
commercial organizations means that these organizations are becoming increasingly vulnerable to
disruption through the disruption of their systems (Garg, Curtis, & Halper, 2003). Thus
information systems are becoming more interesting as targets of subjection. In terms of
Information security, a subjection threat is one aimed at subjugating systems and their
stakeholders by disabling or controlling these systems. Subjection threats are a demonstration of
power over an organization (or a government), achieving subjugation by disabling or diverting
the systems necessary to its function. Talented hackers have managed for decades, in small and
large ways, to subjugate some of the information assets of mighty corporations by breaking into
their critical information systems.
2.2.1

The Usual Suspects: Vandalizing Hackers

The same technologies that have empowered global economic commerce are also empowering
hackers (and hacking organizations) to grow in their ability to subjugate information systems
using powerful intrusion tools, distributed denial of service attacks, and malicious code like
viruses and worms. Thus, at a time when the vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly dynamic,
so too are the historical sources of threat (Schultz, 2002).
2.2.2

Information Warfare

The historical sources of threat, however, are being joined by more powerful parties who have
more dramatic interests in systems subjection. These parties are military and quasi-military (e.g.,
revolutionary or terrorist) organizations engaging in warfare operations. In addition to
empowering dramatic advances in managing and coordinating business operations, information
systems have also empowered similarly dramatic advances in managing and coordinating military
operations. Computers in battleground settings have enabled a precision in the military
application of force that is considered to be a “Revolution in Military Affairs.” (cf. Bhalla, 2003)
It has naturally followed that military organizations are rapidly developing techniques to attack
and defend the valuable and critical advantages of these military information systems. The result
has become known as information warfare, “Information operations conducted during time of
crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or
adversaries.” Information operations are “actions taken to affect adversary information and
information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.” (DOD
Directive S-3600.1, 1996, cited in Denning, 1999) This widely cited definition is important
because of its distinction between information warfare, which is reserved for conflict, and
information operations, which may be ongoing in peacetime as well as wartime (Jones, Kovacich,
& Luzwick, 2002).

As a result of increasingly sophisticated information operations, specialists in military
information systems are drawing considerable resources into the development of pervasive
attacks and hardened defences for information systems. These operations take place in a new
“battlespace” that includes information systems (Crilley, 2001). As a result, information warfare
leads to the development of information operations that represent deeply sophisticated and
advanced subjection threats. In order to remain effective in both defensive and offensive
operations, those responsible for information operations must race to explore ways to exploit new
information technologies using subjection threats. In this way, military organizations are driving
forward the tempo in subjection threat dynamics, at least in the military battlespaces.
2.2.3

National Information Infrastructures

The information battlespace overlaps commercial information resources in many ways. Attention
is mostly drawn to the infrastructures that enable the essential services that underpin a society,
including energy, banking and finance, transportation, vital human services, and
telecommunications. The information systems that are essential to the operation of these essential
services are known as the national information infrastructures (The President’s Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997). The motive for attacks on these infrastructures by
military or quasi-military information operations include the disruption of national defence and
war making capabilities, the distraction of defence resources from other parts of battlespace, and
the undermining of public confidence in national leadership.
Most of the sensational reports of the current vulnerabilities of these infrastructures are
overblown. These national information infrastructures are proving to be somewhat robust in the
face of current information security threats (Verton, 2003). The various “hacker wars” that have
erupted in the shadow of national confrontations have failed to produce any notable impact
(Vatis, 2001), and have developed into something more like juvenile food fights than serious
warfare (Berkowitz, 2003).
However, in at least one incident, concepts developed for information warfare have been applied
in an attack by quasi-military information operations against national infrastructures. In 2000,
pro-Israeli hackers attacked web sites belonging to the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah and
Hamas. The pro-Palestinian retaliation was a well-designed, phased information operation. The
first phase took down government web sites (the Knesset, the Defense Forces, and the Foreign
Ministry), the second phase attacked the banking and finance infrastructure (web sites belonging
to the Bank of Israel and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange), and the third phase attacked the
telecommunications infrastructure (NetVision, the main Internet service provider) (Vatis, 2001).
Clearly, the high-tempo emergent threats arising from the development of information warfare
operations are appearing on the horizon of commercial information systems. These are subjection
threats that are likely to be brilliantly designed for surprise, coordinated attacks. It appears that
the increasing vulnerabilities of information systems will lead critical information infrastructures
into more vulnerable postures at just about the same time that the subjection threats become
considerably more powerful and pervasive.
Information warfare is raising the stakes in information security by positioning intensive and
highly novel subjection threats against several sectors of commercial systems.
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THE SECURITY RESEARCH GAP IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Research in information and communications technologies are developing underlying security
technologies that can be used in addressing the changing security landscape. For example,
advanced firewalls and virtual private networking (VPN) can be used to fragment organizational

information systems into security compartments, and to extend a secure network architecture
across unsecured public networks like the Internet. While these are useful tools, we lack research
into techniques for applying these tools in dynamic environments, such as in high-tempo
emergent organizations. Information security managers will need to manage an increasingly
complex security architecture in support of an emergent organization. In order to provide the
groundwork for such management, information security researchers need to develop
organizational approaches and methodologies that respond to this new context by providing
techniques for supporting “emergent security.”
Like its organizational counterpart, emergent information security endures continual change, a
state in which the security architecture and the security organization are seeking stability, while
never achieving it. The security organization (and its architectural product) also continually
remakes itself in self-referential ways as it interacts with its context. Emergent security copes
with the dynamics of organizations, shifting information systems architectures, and shifting
vulnerabilities and threats by maintaining continual agility.
Driven by the emergence in its context, security organizations and security architectures are
already somewhat emergent. However, it would be unfortunate if security managers continue to
operate as if security architectures, security organizations, and their context were still stable. It
will become increasingly difficult to respond to a high-tempo emergent security landscape with
an unresponsive, monolithic security organization and architecture.
Research into emergent information security management can draw from at least two existing
streams of research. These research streams include defensive information warfare and agile
systems development
3.1

Principles of Defensive Information Warfare

Information warfare extends to both offensive and defensive information operations. The
primary goal of these operations is the achievement of information superiority. Information
superiority is the condition of acquiring, synthesizing, processing and sharing vital information to
an extent greatly exceeding that of an adversary (Hall, 2003). Offensive information operations
regard degrading or destroying the vital information systems assets of an adversary, and are
generally of interest only in military operations. Defensive information warfare, however,
includes information operations that are aimed at protecting the organization’s information assets.
These practices are very similar to the security practices commonly found in many well-secured
commercial organizations.
However, there is one substantial, conceptual difference. Defensive information warfare
operations, like their offensive counterpart, regard the OODA cycle as a basic measure of their
effectiveness. The OODA cycle, (observe, orient, decide, and act) is the basic measure of the
responsiveness of a effective security unit. An effective unit will sense a change in its setting
(observe), analyze the meaning and importance of this change (orient), determine an ideal
strategy taking advantage of the change (decide) and then implement this strategy (act).
Information superiority is achieved when the cycle times for this OODA cycle is markedly
shorter than that of an adversary.
3.2

Principles of Short-Cycle Development

The importance of short cycle times is familiar in competitive ISD communities. This class of
ISD approaches, including agile methodologies and internet speed software, engage the principle
of shortened cycle times with somewhat similar goals to defensive information operations:
Competitive (superior) information.

Research into short cycle time development shows that a package of at least five key practices
characterize this form of development. These practices include a focus on completion speed,
release-oriented parallel prototyping, adherence to a fixed architecture, negotiable quality, and an
ideal workforce (Baskerville & Pries-Heje, 2004). These practices respond to at least seven agile
principles: Accept multiple valid approaches, engage the customer, accommodate requirements
change, build on successful experience, develop good teamwork, effective software development
conforms to project environment constraints, prepare for unexpected consequences from
innovation in software processes (Baskerville et al., 2003).
3.3

Conflating Information Warfare and Short Cycle Development Theories for
Commercial Information Security

These short-cycle practices and agile principles enable systems developers to observe, orient,
decide, and act in response to changes in their software system’s marketplace. Observation is
enabled by customer engagement, orientation and decisions are enabled by prototyping and a
fixed architecture, and action is enabled by ideal teamwork, negotiable approaches and quality,
and accommodation for change. The similarity between the principles and practices of short-cycle
development and defensive information operations is intriguing. Further research would be in
order to determine if the short-cycle principles could be used by information security managers to
implement concepts from defensive information warfare in order to create agile, emergent
information security.
Such research could demonstrate that information warfare theory and short cycle systems theory
can be fused and extended as a basis for a new theory of emergent information security. This
theory would support agile security development as a basis for construct a commercial OODA
cycle enabling organizational information security managers to gain information superiority over
the exploitation of emergent vulnerabilities by subjection threats. It appears promising that an
agile, emergent security organization would be responsive to the dynamic vulnerability and threat
landscape that future information systems are clearly going to find as their context.
Such agile information security development practices would anticipate threats and rapidly
deploy innovative safeguards in the context of shifting systems landscapes amid pervasive
systems threats. Research must empirically demonstrate that an alignment between information
warfare theory and short cycle theory would operate against constantly changing vulnerability
and threat constellations. The result would be approaches and methodologies that would
effectively result in agile information security development.
3.4

Comparing Agile Security and Existing Approaches

The development of agile security approaches would likely continue the existing evolutionary
path of existing information systems security development and management methodologies.
Siponen (2001) provides a thorough review of these methods in a generational analysis.
Siponen’s first and second generations are characterised as conventional approaches and include
checklists, risk analysis, formal models and management/evaluation standards. First generation
approaches arise largely from practical experience. Siponen’s third generation is characterised as
non-conventional approaches, and includes security semantics, the logical design approach, the
spiral approach, abuse case modelling, and the use of object-oriented, entity relationship, and data
flow techniques for security design purposes. Third generation approaches arise from the
application of concepts from computer science, database, and information systems disciplines in
the development of secure information systems. Siponen’s fourth generation, which he
characterises as IS Community Approaches, includes sociotechnical methods and responsibility

modelling. Fourth generation approaches arise from concerns about the security and welfare of
the social community involved.
In the analysis above, we linked the rising dynamics of security threats and the availability of
short cycle time development approaches. The concept of responding to fast-moving threats with
fast-moving systems adaptation falls readily into Siponen’s third generation of non-conventional
approaches. In this case, we are simply applying concepts from software engineering in solving a
security problem. However, the underlying causal factors leading to the severity of the dynamic
security threats is of a more social nature. Drawing in principles of information warfare
represents a formulated response of defensive information warfare in the face of offensive
information warfare. These factors more readily fall into Siponen’s IS Community Approaches
because of the relationship to national infrastructures, terrorism, international law and morality.
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THE RESEARCH AGENDA

The analysis and arguments above has shown that the high-tempo emergence of organizations
and their information systems is both enabled and endangered by the information and
communication technologies involved. The security of these technologies is growing problematic
because of the dynamics in both the constellation of information systems vulnerabilities and the
threats being leveled against these systems. The conflation of defensive information warfare
theory and short cycle development theory suggests a possible avenue for future research that
may prove fruitful in developing new emergent forms of security safeguard development.
As a result of this argument, there is a research agenda that raises at least three key questions for
information systems researchers.
Research Question 1: How can agile methods be used to generate effective security requirements?
This research question is a theoretical question leading to a theory formulation. Although this
work is partly completed above, additional theoretical development is needed to draw specific
methods and techniques from the conflation of information warfare and agile systems
development theories. This question will address issues such as: Can the two theories be directly
ported into commercial security development? Does the conflation of the two theories lead to
practical methods and techniques? Exactly how must information warfare and short cycle
development theories be extended or modified to shape an emergent security theoretical
framework? Are new security organizational forms or particular kinds of specialists required to
fit these theories?
Research Question 2: In what ways do these agile methods change the development of security
requirements?
This research question follows research question 2, and is an empirical question leading to
descriptive results. It addresses the security development experience under the light of the new
theoretical framework. This question will address issues such as: Is security requirements
analysis easier, quicker, or less thorough than more traditional approaches. Are multiple
approaches to security development needed? Are the requirements definitions more flexible,
more attuned to changes in security vulnerabilities and threats, or dependent on a standard
information security architecture?
Research Question 3: How is the outcome of emergent security development different from more
traditional forms.
This research question follows research question 3, and it is also an applied question leading to
descriptive results. It addresses the ultimate success arising from the application of theory and
practice in developing security safeguards for information systems. This question will address

issues such as: Do emergent security organizations detect sudden changes in vulnerabilities or
threats better than more traditional security organizations? Do the short cycle security safeguards
deploy faster than more traditional methods? That is, is the result a form of security that is indeed
more agile? Is the security better because it is more responsive? Does emergent information
security lead to fewer security incidents? Are emergent safeguards maintainable or are they
throwaway artefacts? Is emergent security cheaper or more expensive than more traditional
forms?
These three questions illustrate the primary research agenda that proceeds from the analysis and
arguments linking high-tempo emergent organizations, the changing landscape of information
security vulnerabilities and threats, and the conflation of information warfare and short cycle
development in pursuit of better information security. Since systems security is recognized as an
important consideration in future information systems developments, there is a clear avenue for
important, timely, and badly needed research to investigate these questions.

5

SUMMARY

Global competition is driving commercial information systems to be increasingly emergent in the
face of increasingly more sophisticated threats. There is a growing gap between these
information systems and the management of their security. Vulnerabilities are rising as a result.
New principles and practices are needed in the security management arena that close this gap.
One promising solution is the development of new approaches for the rapid and continuous
development of security safeguards. Such a solution might easily draw from developed bodies of
knowledge in information warfare and short cycle time development for the purposes of building
agile information security. As in the field of software engineering, however, this solution does
not supplant existing security principles or practices, but instead provides a supplement or
extension. Short cycle time software development is premised on a well-formed and durable
architecture. Similarly, agile security methods will require a well-formed and durable security
architecture. Traditional information security management principles will endure in order to
continue protecting traditional systems against traditional threats.
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